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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A RULE OLD AND NEW, BORROWED AND BLUE: EXXON ADAPTS
STATE PUNITIVE LIABILITY LAW TO CRAFT NEW
INTERPRETATION IN ADMIRALTY

INTRODUCTION
Eleven million gallons of crude oil spilled, 1,500 shoreline miles
contaminated, and nineteen years of litigation fought.1 These are the wellknown hallmarks of the cases collectively known as Exxon. Yet, landmark
liability and damages issues from this 1989 catastrophe continue to create
slippery scenarios for today’s courts. Complex issues of liability and damages
resulting from the 1989 Exxon Valdez incident, the largest oil spill in United
States maritime history, have created intense litigation now spanning two
decades.2 Though the Supreme Court’s June 2008 treatment of this case
marked the nearing finale of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,3 the Court’s
decision will become a landmark decision in not only admiralty law, but in all
American punitive damage law.
The Court’s milestone decision in Exxon carries value for all American
courts regardless of their posture as admiralty courts. The Court’s brief
discourse on due process certainly requires the attention of lower courts and
courts sitting in admiralty with facts similar to Exxon’s limitation on punitive
damages. A significant though less discussed strand will be that regarding
common law limitation on nonadmiralty punitive damages.
Exxon was decided under admiralty law given the accident’s occurrence on
the seas; the precedent on which it must rely and for which it will stand is,
strictly speaking, limited to admiralty.4 But Exxon’s limited posture as an
admiralty case will not limit the inevitable significance the decision will bear

1. Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Fifteen Years Later
(March 24, 2004), http://www.defenders.org/newsroom/press_releases_folder/2004/03_24_2004
_exxon_valdez_oil_spill_fifteen_years_later; Exxon Valdez Case Heads to Closure After 19
Years, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.wholetruth.net/downloads/pressReleases/02272008%20Red%
20Orbit.pdf.
2. THE NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ES-2 (1989), available at http://www.akrrt.org/Archives/Response_Reports/Exxon
Valdez_NRT_1989.pdf.
3. 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) [hereinafter Exxon].
4. See id. at 2619 (discussing Exxon’s reliance upon admiralty law in the context of
punitive damages).
357
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on general American common law in the future.5 This note will establish the
importance of the Exxon holding by drawing parallels to other cases of
admiralty that have impacted the general common law. At the core of this
issue is the dynamic—and under-studied—interplay between the narrow area
of admiralty law and the larger arena of general common law.
In Exxon, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
punitive damages were appropriately awarded against Exxon for its liability in
the 1989 oil spill and, if so, whether those damages were excessive.6 At the
time the Court heard the case, the punitive damage award stood at $2.5 billion,
dwarfing compensatory damages, which remained at $507.5 million.7 The
issue of whether and how to limit excessive punitive damages arose under
federal admiralty law and was an issue of first impression for the Court.8
Monumentally, the Court drew a bright-line rule that limited punitive damages
to the amount awarded in compensatory damages in maritime cases where
reckless conduct resulted in injury.9 Readers are best primed to understand the
underlying rationale of this stringent bright-line rule by first appreciating the
key facts and context of this case.
I. FACTS
The Exxon Valdez incident of 1989 has become the infamous oil spill in
American history given its large size, traumatic environmental effect, and,
most notably, the fact that it could have been prevented.10 Just minutes after
midnight on March 24, 1989, an Exxon Valdez bulk oil carrier collided into
Bligh Reef, located off the coast of Alaska.11 The vessel’s cargo consisted of
more than 53 million gallons of crude oil.12 Within five hours, the vessel had
spilled 10.1 million gallons of crude oil (20% of its total cargo) into the sea

5. For a discussion on the existence of a “general common law,” see Louise Weinberg,
Back to the Future: The New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523 (2004).
6. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611.
7. Id. at 2611, 2634.
8. Id. at 2619.
9. Id. at 2633.
10. KARLENE H. ROBERTS & WILLIAM H. MOORE, MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN ERROR IN
OPERATIONS OF MARINE SYSTEMS, A GORDIAN KNOT: INTO WHICH SAILED THE EXXON
VALDEZ, REPORT NO. HOE-92-1, at 8, 10, 25 (Jan. 1992), available at http://www.mms.gov/
tarprojects/167/167AC.pdf (detailing the large margin for human error in maritime technology
and Exxon’s policies and management which contributed to the risk and the compounding
consequences); Edwin S. Rothschild, Letter to the Editor, A Debate over Punitive Damages, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, at F12. For a detailed discussion regarding the National Response Team’s
report and prevention recommendations to the U.S. President, see generally NAT’L RESPONSE
TEAM, supra note 2.
11. THE NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM, supra note 2, at ES–1.
12. Id. at 3, A–1 (further noting this oil was contained in 1.26 million barrels).
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and surrounding coast line.13 The oil enveloped 1,000 square miles by April
13, just weeks after the spill.14
The remote location of the spill confounded the already difficult cleanup
efforts; it took clean-up personnel and their equipment two hours by boat to
reach the spill site from Valdez, the nearest town.15 Exxon organized 12,000
people and 1,500 boats to manually remove oil from the contaminated
beaches.16 Crews used various methods to clean the spill, some of which
proved controversial because small animals vital to the ecosystem were killed
in the process.17 Oil was cleaned by burning it off, mechanically removing it
from the water, and spraying it off with highly pressurized or heated water.18
The initial accident resulted from a collision of compounding factors.
While docked at port, the crew consumed multiple alcoholic beverages before
picking up pizza to bring back onboard.19 While marine crew are not barred
from drinking alcohol onshore, regulations provide for the amount of time that
must pass between consumption and the continuation of responsibility
onboard.20 The fact garnering the most media attention was Captain Joe
Hazelwood’s conduct, who was not only a known recovering alcoholic, but
also had a dangerously high blood-alcohol content following the accident.21
Hazelwood abandoned the third mate, Gregory Cousins, on the bridge to
complete navigational calculations (a violation of company policy that required

13. Id. at 12; see also R.T. Paine et al., Trouble on Oiled Waters: Lessons from the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, 27 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY SYSTEMATICS 197, 198 (1996) (stating that, in sum,
the vessel spilled 10.8 million gallons of oil).
14. THE NAT’L. RESPONSE TEAM, supra note 2, at 13.
15. Id. (noting Valdez is a small Alaskan town with a population of 4,000 and a small
airstrip whose traffic jumped from ten flights a day to 1,000 during clean-up efforts).
16. Paine et al., supra note 13, at 202.
17. See EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
RESTORATION PLAN: UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES 10–11 (Nov. 2006)
(noting that the productivity rates of the Black Oystercatcher decreased with the onset of clean-up
efforts).
18. NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARIES OF SIGNIFICANT
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SPILLS, 1967–1991, REPORT NO. HMRAD 92–11 (1992).
19. DAVID LEBEDOFF, CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST LEGAL BONANZA
OF OUR TIME 10–11 (The Free Press 1997).
20. Id. at 10.
21. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2612 (2008) (“Its captain
was one Joseph Hazelwood, who had completed a 28-day alcohol treatment program while
employed by Exxon, as his superiors knew, but dropped out of a prescribed follow-up program
and stopped going to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.”); see also Investigator Testifies of
Smelling Alcohol on Hazelwood’s Breath, N.Y. TIMES , Feb. 17, 1990, at 13; but see Tanker’s
Captain Seemed Sober, Pilot Tells Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1990, at A17 (describing testimony
that Hazelwood did not seem intoxicated). See generally LEBEDOFF, supra note 19, at 1–17
(providing an interesting narrative on the incident).
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two officers on the bridge at any time).22 Already fatigued from his first shift,
Cousins began an unscheduled second shift at midnight and also retreated from
the bridge to complete navigational calculations.23 Just after midnight, only
the helmsman was on the bridge—minutes later, when the vessel did not turn
quickly enough, the vessel directly struck Bligh Reef.24 The oil spilled rapidly,
and Exxon’s liability rapidly stacked up.
The National Transportation Safety Board conducted an official
investigation of the disaster.25 The agency concluded that several factors
contributed to the probable cause:
[T]he failure of the third mate [Cousins] to properly maneuver the vessel
because of fatigue and excessive work load; the failure of the master
[Hazelwood] to provide a proper navigation watch because of impairment from
alcohol; the failure of Exxon Shipping Company to provide a fit master and a
rested and sufficient crew for the Exxon Valdez; the lack of an effective Vessel
Traffic Service because of inadequate equipment and manning levels,
inadequate personnel training, and deficient management oversight; and a lack
26
of pilotage services.

Despite significant cleanup efforts, the incident’s impact on the
environment, wildlife, and commerce remains, even after almost twenty
years.27 Some beaches are still polluted with oil, showing little and slowing
change over the past decade.28 In addition to the hundreds of thousands of
animals that died immediately following the spill, some entire species are still
“not recovering.”29 Even the commercial fishing industry has not recovered,30
an injury constituting many of the private legal claims against Exxon.31

22. LEBEDOFF, supra note 19, at 13–15.
23. Id. at 13–14.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Jim Hall, Chairman, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Remarks at the Wash. Traffic Safety
Comm’n Symposium on Driver Fatigue (Nov. 21, 1996), http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/former/
hall/jh961121.htm (discussing the National Transportation Safety Board’s official findings). See
also NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT: GROUNDING OF THE U.S.
TANKSHIP EXXON VALDEZ ON BLIGH REEF, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, NEAR VALDEZ, ALASKA,
NTSB/MAR-90/04 (Mar. 24, 1989). The report is available for purchase through the National
Technical Information Service at http://www.ntis.gov/search/product.aspx?ABBR=PB90916405.
26. Hall, supra note 25.
27. See EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 9. In fact, the
impact on the environment has not significantly changed over the past decade. See, e.g., Sam
Howe Verhovek, Across 10 Years, Exxon Valdez Casts a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at
A1 (noting that in 1999 only two species affected by the accident had recovered).
28. Jeffrey W. Short et al., Slightly Weathered Exxon Valdez Oil Persists in Gulf of Alaska
Beach Sediments After 16 Years, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1245, 1245 (2007) (noting that in 2001,
an estimated 100 tons of oil remained on the beaches).
29. EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 6 tbl.1.
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The extensive and diverse consequences of the accident gave rise to
compound litigation. The United States government and private plaintiffs sued
Exxon and particular employees in both criminal and civil contexts.32 In sum,
eighty plaintiff law firms litigated competing claims that required two hundred
experts, one thousand depositions, almost twenty million documents, and $5.3
billion in verdicts and settlements.33 The original 1994 civil judgment alone
awarded $5 billion in punitive damages to 34,000 fishermen and other
plaintiffs who claimed economic injury from the incident.34 These facts
illustrate the incident’s magnitude and the intertwining interests which add
color to the case’s procedural posture.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A.

“Trial Phases”: The District Court’s Organization of Parties and
Liabilities

Exxon’s legal liability stemming from its 1989 incident touched both
criminal and civil law.35 Exxon was charged under several United States
environmental laws, attaching a $25 million fine plus $150 million in
restitution.36 The U.S. also sought civil liability against Exxon, which entered
a consent decree that Exxon would pay a minimum of $900 million toward the
restoration of natural resources.37 Additionally, Exxon’s settlements with
private parties such as fishermen totaled another $303 million.38

30. Id. at 35 (“[C]ommercial fishing, as a lost or reduced service, is in the process of
recovering from the effects of the oil spill, but full recovery has not been achieved.”).
31. In fact, Exxon had already fully compensated for the harm to the environment; the
punitive damages at stake in Exxon were to be paid directly to commercial fishermen whose
livelihoods suffered as a result of this incident. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128
S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008).
32. See id. at 2613. See also Keith Schneider, Tenacious Lawyer Turns Exxon Spill Into
Pollution Case for the Ages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at B7 (“About 15,000 fishermen and
other Alaskan plaintiffs sued Exxon, asserting that the spill had destroyed their livelihoods.”).
33. N. Robert Stoll, Litigating and Managing a Mass Disaster Case: An Oregon Plaintiff
Lawyer’s Experience in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1995, at 14,
15.
34. Keith Schneider, Exxon is Ordered to Pay $5 Billion for Alaska Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 1994, at 1. For a discussion on the competing interests and injuries, see Laura Mansnerus,
Business and the Law; A Paper Spill Due in the Valdez Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at D2.
35. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
36. Id. (noting Exxon pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act, Refuse Act of
1899, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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But many of the civil cases failed to settle and continued through
litigation.39 The district court divided the remaining plaintiffs, all of whom
sought compensatory damages, into three classes: (1) commercial fishermen;
(2) Native Alaskans; and (3) landowners.40 The same district court also
certified a mandatory class of plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, collectively
known as Baker, which totaled 32,000 individuals.41 After Exxon stipulated its
negligence and liability for compensatory damages, the ensuing trial was
subsequently divided into three phases.42
The “trial phase” design allowed for clarity and organization of Exxon’s
liability given that plaintiffs suffered injury in varied degrees.43 Phase I
determined that the conduct of Exxon and Captain Hazelwood was reckless,
for which the court attached punitive liability on both Exxon and Hazelwood.44
Phase II focused on the compensatory damages owed to commercial fishermen
and Native Alaskans.45 While the jury award totaled $287 million in
compensatory damages to commercial fishermen, this amount was drastically
decreased to $19 million after the court deducted settlements and released
claims.46 Phase III triggered the actual calculation of punitive damages for
which Exxon and Hazelwood would each be liable.47 During Phase III,
evidence was introduced regarding the relevant acts and omissions of Exxon’s
management demonstrating the degree to which punitive liability should be
imposed on the defendants.48 The jury returned punitive damage awards
against both parties: an award of $5 billion against Exxon and $5,000 against
Captain Hazelwood.49

39. See id. (noting that the “remaining civil cases were consolidated into” one case against
Exxon, Hazelwood, and others).
40. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Keith Schneider, First Decision of Exxon Valdez Trial Is Expected in Days, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1994, at B8.
44. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614. Additionally, Captain Hazelwood was sentenced to 1000
hours of community service divided over five years for his involvement in the accident. Exxon
Valdez Captain Starts Community Service, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1999, at A23 (noting
Hazelwood’s community work involved collecting abandoned car parts from the roadside).
45. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Ninth Circuit Rejects Exxon’s Multifaceted Appeal Regarding Punitive
Liability

On appeal, Exxon objected not only to the amount of punitive damages the
court awarded, but also to being held punitively liable at all.50 Exxon waged
its argument on several fronts, none of which was persuasive to the Ninth
Circuit.51 First, Exxon contested its punitive liability, arguing that expenses
for the cleanup and criminal and civil sanctions already served as adequate
punishment and deterrence from future conduct.52 Exxon forcefully claimed
that Exxon’s payments for cleanup and sanctions already met the twin aims of
punitive liability—to punish and deter—making it unnecessary to punish and
deter further.53 Yet the court disagreed and stated that, as a general rule, prior
criminal sanctions do not bar punitive damages and, furthermore, that Exxon
presented no precedent to substantiate its policy argument.54
Exxon also contended that, in any event, punitive damages were flatly
prohibited in admiralty law.55 Unfortunately for Exxon, it again failed to
persuade the Ninth Circuit that punitive liability was barred because, as the
court indicated, punitive damages are indeed appropriate in maritime under
certain circumstances.56 The court dismissed this argument with brevity, only
impliedly indicating that any of these circumstances were applicable to Exxon
in the present case.57
In sum, Exxon and Baker cross-appealed several times; a central concern
was the amount of punitive damages, which were to vindicate “the public
interest in punishing harm to the environment.”58 The punitive damages were
reduced from the original $5 billion to $4 billion, increased from $4 billion to
$4.5 billion, again reduced from $4.5 billion to $2.5 billion, and ultimately,

50. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S.
Ct. 2605 (2008).
51. Id. at 1246–47 (holding that punitive damages were appropriate but excessive).
52. Id. at 1225. See Joint Reply Brief and Joint Answering Brief of Exxon Corp. and Exxon
Shipping Co. at 1, In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, 554 U.S. ___, 128
S.Ct. 2605 (2008) (Nos. 97-35191 & 97-35193) (“Exxon’s $3.5 billion in spill-related costs and
expenses was enough to deter anyone from anything. And Exxon’s post-spill changes in
procedures demonstrate that deterrence was accomplished in fact”).
53. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225.
54. Id. at 1226.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1226 n.14 (“Although rarely imposed, punitive damages have long been
recognized as an available remedy in general maritime actions where defendant’s intentional or
wanton and reckless conduct amounted to a conscious disregard of the rights of others.”) (citation
omitted).
57. Id. at 1226.
58. In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), amended by
490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008).
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drastically cut to $507.5 million by the Supreme Court.59 Plaintiffs from all
classes were naturally disappointed by each reduction, as these punitive
damages were specifically earmarked to compensate them for their economic
losses.60 At the time of its final plea to the Supreme Court, Exxon posted its
largest-ever quarterly income of $11.68 billion while it faced already-reduced
punitive damages remaining at $2.5 billion.61
III. DIVIDED SUPREME COURT
A.

Circuit Split Foreshadows Split Court on Exxon’s Liability for
Hazelwood’s Actions

The first issue the Court addressed was whether the district court correctly
instructed the jury that “a corporation ‘is responsible for the reckless acts
of . . . employees . . . in a managerial capacity while acting in the scope of their
employment.’”62 Exxon relied on maritime precedent from 200 years ago in
asserting that a ship owner cannot be liable for punitive damages due to its
shipmaster’s recklessness.63 It claimed that the jury instructions, as given,
wrongfully operated “[to tell] the jury that Exxon must be deemed reckless
solely on account of Hazelwood’s reckless acts whether or not those acts
violated properly enforced corporate policies.”64 As such, Exxon claimed that
it was inappropriate to premise punitive damages on a theory of vicarious
liability solely for the conduct of its agent.
The Court acknowledged that this form of vicarious liability is barred in
some federal circuits and that the circuits are nonetheless split.65 With shallow
discussion on this issue, the Justices noted they were split, thus owing full
deference to the Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow punitive damages based on
the corporate liability theory.66 While this did not create precedent on the

59. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008); In re Exxon
Valdez, 472 F.3d 600 at 602 (summarizing procedural history).
60. Fishermen Express Dismay over Exxon Valdez Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at
A20.
61. Clifford Krauss, Exxon’s Second-Quarter Earnings Set a Record, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
2008, at C2. This profit set other records as well—it was the “best quarterly profit ever for a
corporation . . . .” Id.
62. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605 at 2615 (citations omitted).
63. Brief for the Petitioners at 18, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct.
2605 (2008) (No. 07-219).
64. Id. at 26.
65. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2615. The Court noted that some circuits—but not all—have
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts rule. Id. at 2615 n.4. Compare In re Exxon Valdez,
270 F.3d 1215, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting the Restatement rule), with CEH, Inc. v. F/V
Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding the Restatement rule not applicable to the
case).
66. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616.
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Supreme Court’s part, it did allow for the analysis to proceed through the
remaining issues of punitive liability.
B.

Exxon Again Argues Statutory Remedy Preemption . . . To No Avail

Throughout litigation, Exxon consistently used the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) to argue that the CWA statutorily preempted the availability of
punitive damages.67 Exxon’s argument, specifically, was that the CWA’s
provisions preempted any maritime punitive damages because it was a statute
“not addressed to compensation for private harms, but instead prescribes a
comprehensive, calibrated scheme of public enforcement . . . .”68 This public
enforcement, according to Exxon, was a remedy sufficient in itself, thereby
precluding punitive damages for civil liability to private parties for conduct
within this statute.69
The Court disagreed on the merits of this argument.70 The CWA, it
explained, did not preempt remedies—compensatory and punitive damages
especially—to the degree Exxon argued: it was not “intended to eliminate sub
silentio oil companies’ common law duties to refrain from injuring the bodies
and livelihoods of private individuals.”71 If this were the case, the statute
would directly or clearly express a congressional intent to preempt the field or
destroy the common law duty.72 In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Court
concluded that even if such preemption could be indirectly construed or
implied, that alone was not enough to abridge a common-law principle such as
punitive liability.73 Having decided that punitive damages were appropriate in
the instant maritime case, and not preempted by any federal statute, the Court
proceeded to the main event: Exxon’s outstanding punitive damages.

67. Id. at 2617 (citations omitted). The Clean Water Act is designed to protect waterways
and prevent their pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
68. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 63, at 40.
69. Id. at 40–41.
70. The Court noted that there were two interpretations of Exxon’s argument. Exxon, 128 S.
Ct. at 2618. The first was that any tort action premised on an oil spill is preempted unless it is
saved by the statute and the second was that only punitive damages—but not compensatory
damages—would be preempted. Id. at 2618–19. The Court indicated that congressional intent
and statutory language disproved both theories. Id. at 2619.
71. Id. at 2619. In making this determination, the Court considered that the CWA
“expressly” protects “water” and “shorelines” as a statute with these aims would not eliminate
such duties of oil companies. Id. (“All in all, we see no clear indication of congressional intent to
occupy the entire field of pollution remedies.”).
72. Id.
73. Id. The Ninth Circuit provided a thorough analysis on this preemption, though it is
beyond the scope of this Note. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1228–31 (analyzing the
statutory preemption of the common law punitive damages remedy).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

366

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:357

C. Exxon Majority Prescribes a Bright-Line Limitation on Punitive Damages
The heart of Exxon’s appeal was the arguably large size of the punitive
damages award, standing at $2.5 billion after it had been twice reduced in the
Ninth Circuit.74 Exxon contested the Ninth Circuit’s “evasion” of this issue,
claiming that this award was inappropriate given that “plaintiffs . . . received
full compensation [and] deterrence and punishment ha[d] been fully
achieved.”75 Exxon asserted that substantive admiralty law limited the
punitive damages above and beyond implicit constitutional limits.76 This
limitation should exist, Exxon argued, because the underlying policy rationale
that tends to support punitive damages did not properly support the policies in
the instant context:
Such awards penalize maritime commerce rather than protect it; they expand
rather than limit liability; they are unpredictable and inconsistent; they have
nothing to do with compensation for actual injury; and they impede rather than
77
promote settlement and judicial economy.

Exxon alternatively contended that punitive damages were wholly unavailable
because the public interest of awarding punitive damages for punishment and
deterrence was “fully achieved” given the criminal and civil sanctions the
previous courts imposed on Exxon.78 Such sanctions were “enough to deter
anyone from anything” and did not support the judicial aims of uniformity or
predictability.79
As a traditional last resort, however, Exxon argued that even if punitive
damages were not wholly inappropriate, the Court should alternatively adopt a
standard for what qualifies as an appropriate award of punitive damages in
admiralty law.80 Exxon suggested to the Court several such standards that
either existed in current maritime law or were otherwise consistent with it.81
Among those alternatives identified: punitive damages should not exceed those
prescribed by Congress;82 punitive damages should not exceed substantial

74. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1246–47 (order to remand from $5 billion); In re Exxon
Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1110 (D. Alaska 2004) (reducing punitive damages from $5 billion
to $4.5 billion); In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (reducing the award
from $4.5 billion to $2.5 billion due to mitigating factors such as Exxon’s “prompt action . . . to
clean up the oil and to compensate the plaintiffs . . . .”).
75. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 63, at 44.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 46–47.
78. Id. at 48.
79. Id. at 49.
80. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 63, at 50 (warning the Court of “game-show
mentality” where juries award “whatever they will” absent such guideposts of appropriateness).
81. Id. at 51.
82. Id.
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compensatory damages;83 punitive damages should not exceed that which is
required to remove any profit from wrongful conduct that is likely detected;84
and juries may not consider the net worth of corporate defendants in awarding
punitive damages.85
The Exxon Court dismissed the argument that punitive damages were
wholly unavailable but agreed that a limitation on punitive damages in
admiralty law would be reasonable.86 After articulating a brief history and
rationale for punitive damages,87 the Court indicated the “real problem” with
punitive damages was their “stark unpredictability.”88 The undesirable
unpredictability of punitive damages guided the majority’s discussion.89 The
Court dismissed several studies that examined the erratic character of juryawarded punitive damages as insignificant; though these studies identified
“reasonable” statistical means of the size of punitive damage awards, the
means are the result of awards of extreme high and low amounts rather than
amounts that hover near the statistical mean.90 Encouraging predictability was
the cornerstone of the Court’s assessment of creating appropriate limitations.
Traditionally, the Court has given only constitutional treatment to “outlier”
Limiting punitive damages from a constitutional
punitive damages.91
foundation requires assessment under the Due Process Clause and “prohibits
the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”92
This prohibition is squarely based on the notion that “a person receive fair
notice . . . of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”93 Punitive
damages that may be considered excessive or unreasonable become
83. Id. at 52.
84. Id. at 53.
85. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 63, at 54.
86. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2629 (2008)
(discussing possible limits on punitive damages in admiralty law).
87. Id. at 2620–25. Punitive damages are aimed primarily at retribution and deterrence,
whereas compensatory damages compensate injured parties for actual harm. See Cooper Indus.,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (“[Compensatory damages] are
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s
wrongful conduct. [Punitive damages], which have been described as ‘quasi-criminal,’ operate as
‘private fines’ intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.”) (citations
omitted).
88. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2625.
89. Id. at 2625–26 (noting that the vast difference between low and high awards was most
worrisome).
90. Id. The Court acknowledged that it was unaware of any study demonstrating that
punitive damages are consistent across “similar claims and circumstances.” Id. at 2626.
91. Id. at 2626. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003) (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages . . . will satisfy due process.”).
92. State Farm Mut., 538 U.S. at 416.
93. BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
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unpredictable; this unpredictability deprives defendants of Fifth Amendment
fair notice of consequences for unlawful behavior.
Exxon thus presented the Court with a novel question when it contested a
punitive damages award in federal maritime law. Certainly, constitutional
safeguards were entirely relevant (and mandatory), but in this instance the
Court had the opportunity to go beyond a settled constitutional principle and
create a more stringent law.94 Flowing from the Court’s previous evaluation of
punitive damages awards as unpredictable, the Court aimed to have a penalty
that was “reasonably predictable,” allowing actors to make informed decisions
when engaging in unlawful behavior and feel “threaten[ed]” by penalties
imposed upon previous, similarly situated actors.95
To achieve a limitation that would engraft predictability into the punitive
damage system of maritime law, the Justices considered pre-existing
approaches in state law.96 This posed a difficult and subjective task for the
Court as there is great “difficulty in determining when the dollar amount of
punitive damages crosses the line and becomes excessive.”97
Exxon
considered three approaches—one that was qualitative (verbal) and two that
were quantitative.98 A qualitative limitation establishes a guideline premised
upon factors from which the factfinder determines an appropriate amount of
damages; there is no hard and fast monetary “cap.”99 In Gore, for instance, the
Supreme Court identified three “guideposts” to aid the punitive damages
determination: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility” of the conduct;100 (2) the
ratio between compensatory damages for actual harm and the punitive
damages;101 and (3) which typical sanctions exist for “comparable

94. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2627 (“Whatever may be the constitutional significance of the
unpredictability of high punitive awards, this feature of happenstance is in tension with the
function of the awards as punitive, just because of the implication of unfairness that an
eccentrically high punitive verdict carries in a system whose commonly held notion of law rests
on a sense of fairness in dealing with one another.”).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2627–28 (surveying state policies toward limiting punitive damages).
97. Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 139 (2008).
98. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2627.
99. See, e.g., BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996). See also
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993) (noting that the process juries
use to determine punitive damages is qualitative because they must consider “a host of facts and
circumstances unique to the particular case . . . .”); Michael A. Nelson, Constitutional Limits on
Punitive Damages: How Much Is Too Much?, 23 ME. B.J. 42, 42–43 (2008) (claiming that the
TXO Prod. Corp. qualitative test is an “I know it when I see it” test).
100. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
101. Id. at 580.
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misconduct.”102 Conversely, a quantitative limitation imposes a monetary cap,
generally existing as a ratio between punitive damages and actual damages or
as an actual monetary amount that no punitive damage award can exceed.
The Court expressly favored a quantitative analyses over qualitative with
the aim of crafting a rule that would generate consistency and predictability
while operating efficiently toward retribution and deterrence.103 A qualitative
limitation, the Court indicated, was more likely to result in unpredictable
application and outlier amounts.104 In choosing between a quantitative
standard that would establish a proportion and one that would enforce a
monetary cap, the Court valued two factors: the nature of the claim—tort and
contract—and the nature of judicial lawmaking.105 There exists no “standard”
injury in either contract or tort law because what may be an appropriate
“maximum” penalty for one set of facts may be entirely inappropriate under
another set.106 Unlike a legislative body, which would have the opportunity to
occasionally revisit a monetary cap to adjust it for inflation or other concerns, a
court “cannot say when an issue will show up on the docket again.”107 To
avoid establishing precedent that may not be revisited for some time to come,
the Court opted for a proportional limitation which would effectively operate
as a variable maximum with its amount bearing only on the compensatory
damages awarded.
With those concerns in mind, the Exxon Court sifted through varying
proportions to determine how to consistently limit punitive damages while
accounting for the unique nature of every case. Because compensatory
damages compensate for the actual harm, it is fair to tie retribution and
deterrence to that amount.108 The Court found support and validation for this
approach in state law as well as in limited areas of federal legislation.109

102. Id. at 583. In his dissent, Justice Scalia complained that these “guideposts” were a “road
to nowhere [and] they provide no real guidance at all.” Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Several
states use qualitative analyses of punitive damages as well. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 647 A.2d 405, 424–25 (Md. 1994) (reflecting several factors for the jury to consider
in determining punitive damages, such as deterrence and wrongfulness of conduct).
103. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2628 (implying quantitative limits may not impose a standard any
more rigorous than current due process).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2629.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2629. The Court regarded the relevance of compensatory damages
as inherent in the due process analysis. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003).
109. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2629 (noting that treble damages in federal antitrust and patent are
controlled by compensatory damage awards).
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Absent federal maritime law on a single issue, it is not uncommon for courts
sitting in admiralty to “borrow” from state law.110
While Exxon dismissed other studies that discussed the average actual
awarded amount of punitive damages, for the purposes of dictating a
proportion, it valued another study which assessed damage amounts juries and
The median ratio of all
judges regarded as reasonable awards.111
circumstances (from conduct ranging from negligent to malicious) fell at
below 1:1—that is, in most cases, punitive damages were generally regarded as
reasonable when they were less than corresponding compensatory damages.112
Cases such as Exxon, where intention, malice, or primary purpose of personal
gain is lacking, have a statistical median ratio of 0.65:1 (punitive to
compensatory).113 The Court drew a more generous line at 1:1—punitive
damages could no longer outweigh compensatory damages in federal maritime
cases where intent is no more than reckless.114
Principles of admiralty law and constitutional law supported this 1:1 ratio.
The Clean Water Act, for example, permitted a maximum daily penalty for
polluting of $25,000 for negligent violations and $50,000 for polluting with
knowledge.115 Under the due process limitations on punitive damages, the
Supreme Court had previously indicated that single-digit ratio maximums are
almost always appropriate.116 Because the Court found that in Exxon the
punitive damages were appropriate but excessive, the Court swiftly remanded
the case, imposing for the first time its 1:1 bright-line limitation on punitive
damages.
D. Three Justices, Three Dissents: A Legislative—Not Judicial—
Determination in Maritime Law
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer challenged both the present and
future applicability of the Exxon rule in their respective dissents. Justice
Stevens largely relied on principles of maritime law and the importance of
legislative history; Justice Ginsburg discussed the limitation’s unreliability;
Justice Breyer advocated affirmation of the award, citing a number of district
and appeals courts which had condoned the award’s reasonableness.

110. Robert Force, Essay on Federal Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1367,
1374 (1999) (“[S]tate law has been influential in the development of federal maritime law . . . .”).
111. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2632–33.
112. Id. at 2633.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006); Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634.
116. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (2008). See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (noting that when compensatory damages are “substantial” a smaller ratio
may be desirable).
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Justice Stevens: Not Our Rule to Make

In his dissent, Justice Stevens did not outright rebut the limitation on
punitive damages, but rather, took issue with its birth in the judiciary instead of
in the legislature.117 In articulating this, Justice Stevens distinguished federal
maritime law from other law on the basis that “maritime tort law is now
dominated by federal statute.”118 Given that Congress is the primary author of
maritime law, its affirmative decision to not limit punitive damages requires
“judicial restraint” in limiting remedies.119 Justice Stevens relied on an
important distinction that the majority opinion largely disregarded: the
consequence of the lack of legislative restriction on maritime tort damages.120
Justice Stevens cited other areas in which statutes have shielded ship owners
from liability, indicating that Congress exercises its power in limiting remedies
only when it sees fit, and absent this intent, it is not the Court’s responsibility
to supply it.121 In fact, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for failing to
identify any state court that has adopted an equally precise ratio.122 He
likewise noted that state legislatures, not courts, have adopted a limitation that
resembles Exxon.123 Justice Stevens thus advocated that Congress was the
competent body to “assess the empirical data, and to balance competing policy
interests . . . .”124
Justice Stevens further faulted the majority for failing to consider the
unique nature of admiralty law and its remedial schemes by instead misplacing
its reliance on empirical data from land-based legal remedies.125 Unlike other
bodies of law, he noted, compensatory damages are limited in general maritime
law.126 In their modernized form, punitive damages generally serve no
compensatory function; but because compensatory damages are often limited
under admiralty law, courts employ punitive damages to supplement
compensatory damages.127 So punitive damages may be awarded differently in
maritime than in the land-tort context to account for those injuries which
maritime law refuses to award compensatory damages (i.e. purely financial or

117. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2635 (internal citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2635–36 (referring to the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, which shields
shipowners from liability when charged with wrongdoing committed without their knowledge).
122. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2637.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2636–37.
126. Id. at 2636. See generally Brandon T. Morris, Oil, Money, and the Environment:
Punitive Damages Under Due Process, Preemption, and Maritime Law in the Wake of the Exxon
Valdez Litigation, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 165 (2008).
127. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2637 (2008).
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emotional harm).128 An underlying premise in the studies the majority relied
on was that compensation had already accounted for actual harm, so punitive
damages must only deter and punish. Naturally, whether injured parties have
been compensated is a key consideration that will change what a judge or jury
considers a “reasonable” award.
Justice Stevens concluded that the Court should have reviewed Exxon for
“abuse of discretion” (the general standard) rather than applying a strict,
quantitative value.129 If the Court’s primary concern was large outlier awards,
he reasoned, reviewing them for an abuse of discretion would sufficiently
eliminate such troublesome awards.130 Under this standard, the award should
have been affirmed:
In light of Exxon’s decision to permit a lapsed alcoholic to command a
supertanker carrying tens of millions of gallons of crude oil through the
treacherous waters of Prince William Sound, thereby endangering all of the
individuals who depended upon the sound for their livelihoods, the jury could
reasonably have given expression to its “moral condemnation” of Exxon’s
131
conduct in the form of this award.

Justice Stevens believed that although the Court had the power to limit
damages, “it errs in doing so.”132
2.

Justice Ginsburg: No Limiting the Limit’s Application

Justice Ginsburg’s reservation from joining the majority centered on the
bright-line rule with lines that were too ambiguous.133 It was unclear, she felt,
whether this limitation on punitive damages would be applicable only in
admiralty law or whether it signaled a broader constitutional limitation, as
well.134 The implication of this distinction is clear: Which courts will be
bound to this rule? If the Supreme Court does not know, how will a lower
court fearing appellate review know when it must limit available punitive
damages? Compounding this issue was the majority’s reliance on limiting
damages based upon the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct (applying it
only where conduct is reckless).135 Justice Ginsburg noted that while the
majority indicated that reprehensibility affected the limitation, it did not clearly
128. Id. (“[P]unitive damages may serve to compensate for certain sorts of intangible injuries
not recoverable under the rubric of compensation.”).
129. Id. at 2638.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2638 (2008).
133. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (“[I]s the Court holding only that 1:1 is the maritime-law ceiling, or is it also
signaling that any ratio higher than 1:1 will be held to exceed ‘the constitutional outer limit?’”)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
135. Id.
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identify how it did so.136 If courts must limit punitive damages to
compensatory damages when the conduct was reckless, it is unclear how they
should limit punitive damages when the conduct is intentional—or worse,
malicious.
Justice Ginsburg lamented that not only was the majority’s rule unclear
and confusing, but it was also premature because it lacked “an urgent need.”137
She highlighted the majority’s concession that traditional appellate review of
punitive damages (a “reasonability” standard) had not yet resulted in “massproduced runaway awards.” 138 She thus laid her final argument on the point
that absent an immediate problem the rule was excessive and premature.
Justice Ginsburg predicts that the Court will likely return to this issue in the
near future to determine just how far this limitation will reach and whether this
is, in fact, a constitutional limitation.139
3.

Justice Breyer: Deference Owed to the Many Lower Courts that
Decided in Accord

Justice Breyer dissented on the basis that each of the district courts’ awards
was appropriate and adequately investigated.140
He noted that the
reprehensibility of Exxon’s conduct indeed warranted severe punitive liability
because “[t]he jury could reasonably have believed that Exxon knowingly
allowed a relapsed alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled with millions of
gallons of oil through waters that provided the livelihood for the many
plaintiffs in this case.”141 Those facts, he explained, made it reasonable for the
jury to have attached steep punitive damages to Exxon’s conduct.142
Reviewing courts, Justice Breyer noted, “engaged in an exacting review”
multiple times, each with a “more penetrating inquiry” and even when
confronted with the opportunity to conclude that the damages were
unreasonable, the courts chose to maintain relatively similar amounts.143
Despite the appellate remands to lower the award, every court below the
Supreme Court still maintained a punitive damage award that was five times
greater than the compensatory damages.144
Justice Breyer, along with Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, would have
affirmed the Ninth Circuit given the unique nature of admiralty law, the
136. Id.
137. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2639.
138. Id. (citations omitted).
139. Id. (“On next opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling due
process requires in all of the States, and for all federal claims?”).
140. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2639.
143. Id. (citations omitted).
144. Id.
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reprehensibility of Exxon’s conduct, and the uncertain jurisprudential
implications of the new bright line rule.145
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A.

Admiralty Law’s Circular Relationship with General Common Law

The interaction between admiralty and common law is an important
concept to understand because of the unique way in which admiralty law
derives its jurisdiction and authority. Admiralty law, which governs bodies of
water, is a distinctive body of law—“an amalgam of traditional common-law
rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.”146 The
jurisdiction of courts sitting in admiralty is generally “all waters, salt or fresh”
which are “navigable in interstate or foreign water commerce . . . .”147
Admiralty is also one of the few areas of “general” federal common law.148
This is not to say that admiralty law exists as an island in the sea of law; in
reality, there is a substantial relationship and dynamic interplay between the
two bodies—though this relationship is arguably under-studied.
Admiralty law is “aimed at providing the shipping industry with a uniform
body of law.”149 As such, federal admiralty law is mandatory authority over
cases of admiralty law.150 A frequent scenario subsequently arises when
admiralty law is silent on an issue, as in Exxon. In those cases, federal courts
may—and do— “borrow state law” as long as no applicable federal admiralty
law exists.151 It is therefore inevitable that state law is reinvented when federal
courts sitting in admiralty borrow state law to resolve issues of first impression
because federal courts reinterpret and reapply it in unprecedented manners. As
those new interpretations become precedent, their value evolves from purely
persuasive into mandatory to be readopted by the same state courts that loaned
the law in the first place.

145. Id.
146. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864–65 (1986).
147. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 31–32
(Foundation Press 2d ed. 1975).
148. Id. at 45–47.
149. Orgulf Transport Co. v. Hill’s Marine Enterprises, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062
(S.D. Ill. 2002).
150. Id.
151. Id. See also Continental Casualty Co. v. Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 189
F.3d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A federal court sitting in admiralty can, by analogy to the practice
of the federal courts in regard to federal common law . . . , borrow the law of a state or a foreign
country to resolve a dispute that had come into court under the admiralty jurisdiction, especially
when dealing with a subject traditionally regulated by the states. . . .”).
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East River:152 Supreme Court Borrows from State Common Law, Returns
New Law

Prior cases provide the strongest indication that the Exxon decision will
serve as authority in traditional common law, though strictly speaking, the
decision only governs maritime law. This is best demonstrated through
analogy by evaluating how general American courts have transposed Supreme
Court precedent in admiralty into their decisions.
In East River, the Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split
regarding products liability in admiralty law.153 The Court determined as a
threshold issue that products liability was an appropriate body of law under
general maritime law.154 The more specific—and interesting—subject was
whether a claim could be sustained when the only injury was to the product
itself, constituting a purely economic loss.155 Without mandatory admiralty
precedent to guide the Court’s determination, the Court instead surveyed state,
land-based common law.156
At one end was the majority rule that there can be no recovery for a purely
economic injury because such recovery contradicts the public policy guiding
products liability theory.157 Products liability aims to protect consumers by
encouraging manufacturers to fix defects which may cause bodily harm
regardless of their intent or negligence; under this principle, if resulting harm is
only economic and not bodily, the public policy to hold manufacturers liable
diminishes.158 But unlike the majority view, the minority approach extends the
duty of manufacturers to produce non-defective products to all instances, even
when the only resulting harm is purely economic or only to the product
itself.159 The East River Court found both approaches “unsatisfactory,”
because in reality, purely economic injuries resemble contract claims given
that the purchaser is solely deprived the “benefit of its bargain.”160 Warranty
law, not tort claims for negligence or strict liability, provided the appropriate
and sufficient remedy.161 Accordingly, the East River Court held that

152. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
153. Id. at 863.
154. Id. at 865–66 (noting that strict liability has been long recognized relating to injuries of
workers at sea).
155. Id. at 866.
156. Id. at 868–70.
157. E. River, 476 U.S. at 868.
158. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 284–85
(3d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the economic loss doctrine and East River, see Christopher
Scott D’Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law from Drowning in
a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 591 (1995).
159. E. River, 476 U.S. at 868–69.
160. Id. at 870.
161. Id. at 872–74.
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commercial manufacturers do not have any duty to prevent products from
harming themselves;162 consumers may sue only under contract law when
those products harm only themselves.163
Though East River was decided in the context of admiralty law, general
courts took notice of the Supreme Court’s decision. A minority of courts
distinguished their cases from East River, citing differences arising from
governing state law or factual distinctions.164 Most notable was the
overwhelming response by courts sitting in land law to adopt and follow the
East River doctrine. As the Third Circuit noted a year after East River, “We
now predict that Pennsylvania courts, although not bound to do so, would
nevertheless adopt as state law the Supreme Court’s reasoning in East
River.”165 In fact, state courts eagerly adopted the reasoning espoused in East
River.166 The policy supporting the East River holding has largely been the
reason that courts have adopted the rule, despite its firm context in admiralty
law.167 Simply put, when the Supreme Court’s reasoning transcends one area
of law, courts of all areas will take notice.
In sum, East River stands for the proposition that just as the common law
of land influences admiralty law, so too will doctrines of admiralty law impact
land law.168 It is a valid presumption, then, that the Exxon rule will work its
way into the general common law despite its original foundation in admiralty
law.

162. Id. at 871.
163. Id. at 872.
164. See Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Cent. Flying Serv., Inc., 975 F.2d 553, 555 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“Arkansas law permits recovery under strict liability even when the only damages sustained are
to the defective product itself.”).
165. Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that
fire damage to a product was not recoverable and that warranty law provided the appropriate
claim).
166. See Mt. Lebanon Pers. Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848
(6th Cir. 2002) (“A large majority of jurisdictions in this country have adopted the economic loss
rule.”); Winchester v. Lester’s of Minnesota, Inc., 983 F.2d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing
two Kansas state appellate decisions following the reasoning of East River).
167. See Isla Nena Air Servs., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 449 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2006)
(“Although East River is an admiralty case, and its decision is therefore not controlling in
determining Puerto Rico law, we think the policy rationales explained by the Court logically
apply to the decision we reach today.”) (emphasis added).
168. It should be reinforced that the application of these doctrines between admiralty and land
law is persuasive—practitioners still require an understanding of how such authority has been
adopted in their jurisdiction. See generally Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy
Waters of East River: Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260 (1997).
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C. Exxon Will Change the Landscape of Limitations on Punitive Damage
Awards
Exxon’s holding and related discourse will serve as precedent for
American courts in varying ways. Whether the holding will serve as
mandatory or persuasive authority bears upon whether a court is reviewing
punitive damages through the lens of due process or whether it is sitting in
admiralty.169 As such, the holding’s impact can be loosely grouped in three
categories: (1) relevant upon any American court facing a punitive liability due
process issue; (2) mandatory upon any court sitting in admiralty with a reckless
defendant’s punitive liability; and (3) persuasive upon common law courts
reviewing excessive punitive damages.
1.

Exxon’s Due Process Discourse Will Affect Punitive Liability’s
Constitutional Limits

Even though the Court did not ascribe its bright-line rule as an express due
process limitation, there is an implied possibility that it nonetheless signals the
constitutional outer edge of punitive liability. Justice Ginsburg was especially
concerned with the uncertain application of this rule;170 even if it is a stretch to
construe the rule as a constitutional limit in and of itself, it is very plausible
that it marks the first step in this direction. If in doubt, courts will be tempted
to give the rule constitutional treatment even if they have not yet been called to
do so.
In its analysis, the majority stated that under the due process analysis,
compensatory damages bear an “indisputable” relationship with the award of
punitive damages.171 In its constitutional jurisprudence regarding punitive
liability, this relationship has been a central consideration because the actual
harm a defendant has caused is relevant to how the law should deter similar
future conduct and punish that defendant.172 When the Court hints at what the
constitutional limit should be without prescribing a set amount, courts have
been inclined to decide their cases so as to comport with these implied
limitations. In cases predating Exxon, for example, a significant minority of
169. Courts that are not bound to the Exxon precedent may not consider the Exxon decision
regardless of its persuasive value. See Line v. Ventura, No. 1070736, 2009 WL 1425993, at *11
(Ala. May 22, 2009) (declining to consider Exxon because of the Court’s express limitation that
Exxon was an admiralty case).
170. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
171. Id. at 2629.
172. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (noting
that most punitive damages awards that satisfy due process generally bear a single-digit ratio with
actual damages); BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580–81 (1996) (“The
principle that exemplary damages must bear a ‘reasonable relationship’ to compensatory damages
has a long pedigree.”).
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courts still reduced punitive damages based upon Supreme Court guideposts
even though such guidance was purely subjective.173 Following State Farm, a
notable number of courts even reduced punitive damages to match
compensatory damages, though there was no mandate that punitive damages
had to conform to compensatory damages.174
To prevent future judgments from improperly engrafting the Exxon brightline rule into the constitutional analysis, the Court’s own precedent may be the
best safeguard it has. In Gore, for example, the Court detailed hypothetical
situations in which punitive damages and compensatory damages should bear
no relationship on one another; such a situation may arise when “a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages” such
that a court should properly give punitive damages greater weight than
compensatory damages.175 In these opinions, the Court hints that punitive
liability is best decided on a case-by-case basis, and that it cannot “draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.”176
The Court’s discourse in Exxon seems likely to create confusion. While
the Court identified that its rule was not specifically “the outer limit allowed by
due process” it later expressed that, regardless, “the constitutional outer limit
may well be 1:1.”177 Does the Court intend this to become the constitutional
outer limit? In January 2009, the Third Circuit had already identified this
apparent contradiction upon its review of punitive damages that were three
times greater than compensatory damages in a medical malpractice suit.178
The Jurinko court indeed applied the 1:1 bright line rule after examining preExxon cases where this limitation had already been imposed.179 Though
Exxon’s due process discourse was not dispositive in this opinion, it
nonetheless had an apparent effect upon the court’s analysis. Even more
expressly, the Ninth Circuit identified a “constitutional framework” within
173. Michael A. Nelson, Constitutional Limits on Punitive Damages: How Much is Too
Much?, 23 ME. B.J. 42, 44 (2008).
174. Id. at 46–47 (identifying circuit and district court cases where courts voluntarily limited
punitive damages to compensatory damages). See, e.g., Bach v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 486 F.3d
150, 153–54 (6th Cir. 2007) (reducing punitive damages for conduct that was not sufficiently
reprehensible); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 29, 62–65 (2d Cir. 2004) (reducing
punitive damages due to the total award’s size).
175. BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (“[The Court has] consistently rejected the notion that the
constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual
and potential damages to the punitive award.”).
176. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (citations
omitted).
177. Id. at 2634 n.28.
178. Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co., Nos. 06-3519 & 06-3666, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
26263, at *4041 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2008).
179. Id. at *48.
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Exxon which it used to justify one district’s court’s limitation on awarded
punitive damages.180 Neither court felt bound to the Exxon rule or its due
process discourse, but both valued Exxon as authority to premise a due process
limitation upon punitive liability.181
Similarly, under a purely constitutional review of punitive liability, the
Eighth Court noted that Exxon “did not mandate this ratio as a matter of
constitutional law.”182 Still, the court upheld an approximate 1:1 ratio between
compensatory damages and punitive damages on a claim for conversion by
crediting Exxon.183 On a separate claim for trespass, however, the court
declined to enforce the Exxon rule given trespass’s low actual damages but
high reprehensibility.184 The JCB court’s distinction provides optimism that
courts, when applying Exxon as a constitutional guidepost for punitive liability,
will continue to also employ traditional guideposts for limiting punitive
damages that take into account the nature of the injury and conduct.185
Given the Supreme Court’s hesitation to articulate a constitutional
limitation in Exxon—but its relative ease in articulating a limitation upon
admiralty law—it is imperative that the Court, in the future, protect its thin
discourse in Exxon that separates the two. In any event, as lower courts
haphazardly cite to Exxon to limit punitive liability under due process, the
inevitable issue presents itself: To what extent will courts unpredictably apply
Exxon in pursuit of more predictable awards? Whether the Court intended to
constitutionally limit punitive liability under due process, it must likely return
an opinion in the future more express than Exxon to clarify how the 1:1 ratio
should be used. In the meantime, the judicial system can achieve true
predictability only if courts continue to apply the Court’s due process
limitations as espoused in Gore and State Farm, and forego Exxon when
considering damages through the constitutional lens.186

180. Leavey v. Unum Provident Corp., Nos. 06-16285 & 06-16350, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
21144, at *8 nn.1–9 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2008).
181. See id.
182. JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 876 n.9 (8th Cir. 2008) (action for
trespass and conversion) (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 876.
184. Id. at 876–77.
185. Other courts have noted the “importance of keeping these theories straight” between
constitutional and conventional excessive damages claims. Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 678
(7th Cir. 2008). For a discussion on traditional guideposts regarding punitive liability, see State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).
186. For an example of a district court that has expressly identified this distinction, see Smith
v. Xerox Corp., 584 F.Supp.2d 905, 915 n.18 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (indicating that Exxon was
inapplicable as a maritime case); Valarie v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:07-cv-5, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93558, at *21–28 (W.D. Mich., Nov. 17, 2008) (offering a lengthy discourse on the
limited nature of Exxon). See also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F.Supp.2d 841, 859
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Which Maritime Defendants Will Benefit From Exxon’s Rule?

Admiralty law is unique because it exists as a limited exception to the
general rule that there is no “federal general common law.”187 In this arena,
courts have the authority to create what has been termed “the general maritime
law.”188 The general maritime law is part statutory, part judge-made. Thus,
the Court’s decision in Exxon has become mandatory authority for any federal
court sitting in maritime determining the limit of punitive liability.
Though few admiralty courts have determined an issue regarding excessive
punitive damages since Exxon was decided in June 2008, one should presume
that the 1:1 rule will not have the cleanest application (at least initially).189
Courts can, of course, theoretically limit punitive damages to compensatory
damages under circumstances they see fit when no contrary law exists, but
precisely when they must limit punitive damages in this manner is not entirely
clear. Under Exxon, punitive damages must only be limited in precise
proportion to actual damages when the conduct is not exceptionally
blameworthy (intentional, malicious, or driven for gain) or when it is without
“modest economic harm or [low] odds of detection.”190 Arguably, this spans a
diverse spectrum of conduct that falls within Exxon’s net. Though Exxon met
each of these earmarks, it is partially unclear how courts should treat cases that
meet only the majority of these factors. At what point should the fact-finder
determine, for instance, that the odds of detecting reprehensible conduct were
low enough to warrant higher punitive damages? At what point does economic
harm warrant punitive damages in an amount three times the compensatory
damages? Knowing only that the rule will apply in cases like Exxon is simply
not knowing enough, if the true objective of this rule is predictability and
consistency.
3.

Application of Exxon Rationale Will Not Be Limited to Admiralty

It goes without saying that courts must apply the “law of the state” in
issues not governed by the U.S. Constitution or acts of Congress because, as

(N.D. Iowa 2008) (“[T]he [Exxon] Court did not conclude that the Constitution prohibits a
punitive damage award greater than the amount awarded for compensatory damages . . . .”).
187. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
188. Force, supra note 110, at 1367 (noting “maritime law” is, in fact, the oldest area of
federal common law). Though beyond the scope of this note, whether a “general” federal
maritime law is constitutional remains a hotly debated issue among legal scholars. See, e.g., Jay
Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 602–
07 (2006).
189. See Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R. Co v. M/V Marlin, No. 2:08cv134, 2009 WL
1974298, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. April 3, 2009). In Norfolk, the court rejected plaintiff’s amended
complaint for punitive damages pursuant to Virginia statute which provided for 3:1 punitive to
actual damages on the grounds that it conflicted with Exxon. Id.
190. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

A RULE OLD AND NEW, BORROWED AND BLUE

381

Justice Brandeis succinctly stated, “There is no federal general common
law.”191 This is not to say, however, that when the Supreme Court speaks on
an issue that it falls on deaf ears. Inherent in the status of the Supreme Court
as the highest judiciary body in the United States is the inarguable persuasive
value its discourse carries; the Court’s status allows it to “set the agenda for the
country’s political and cultural debate . . . .”192
Damages and their judicially imposed restraints are not governed by the
Constitution or Congress . . . yet. Accordingly, there is no general law that
governs these restraints. And the 1:1 bright-line rule in Exxon was carefully
crafted only for its exclusive application to admiralty law.193 Yet just because
lower federal and state courts are not required to apply Exxon’s holding does
not mean they will not find solace within the rule or its rationale when they
intend to limit punitive damages. This is a remarkable trend with a familiar
situation: the Supreme Court looks to state law to guide its decision in a
narrow area of law, and state courts then take notice of Supreme Court’s
revised law, under which they are not bound.194
The Supreme Court’s doctrinal work in maritime law can have dual
successes when it is well implemented. When the Court disseminates new law,
it “not only solves problems in maritime law but may suggest worthy doctrine
to advance the common law in non-maritime contexts.”195 Just as importantly,
however, if future application of the Exxon rule does, as Justice Ginsburg has
suspected, become unworkable, the Court “not only misses an opportunity to
grow the common law but generally leaves some channel of admiralty law in
turmoil.”196 As such, nonmaritime courts that implement Exxon or its rationale
should use caution in maintaining the intent of Exxon to promote predictability.
Even if courts do not adopt Exxon for its discourse in due process, its
rationale and objective of increasing predictable awards will nonetheless bear
strongly upon future courts. The Ninth Circuit, in its discussion of traditional
guideposts from State Farm additionally discussed Exxon by explaining that
“our goal [under Exxon] is to determine whether the punitive damages
achieved their ultimate objectives of deterrence and punishment, without being
unreasonable or disproportionate.”197 In a different opinion, the Ninth Circuit

191. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (1938).
192. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding
to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 313, 315 (2009)
(noting that the “high-profile” cases the Court chooses “frame the broader cultural debate by
pushing these issues to the forefront of political discourse.”).
193. As the Exxon Court stressed, however, state courts and legislatures have heavily
regulated punitive damage awards. Exxon, 128 U.S. at 2623.
194. See supra Part IV.B.
195. Joel K. Goldstein, Towage, 31 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 335, 335 (2000).
196. Id.
197. S. Union Co. v. Irvin, 563 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 2009).
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again relied on the purpose of the Exxon rule as “the importance of notifying
defendants of their potential punitive damage liability.”198 From these cases it
is clear that the Court’s well-articulated objective of predictability will
influence the diligence with which courts will review punitive damages
awards; even if these awards bear no conformity to one another across the
board, the judiciary’s cognizance of the importance of predictability will
undoubtedly support that goal.
Courts will also apply Exxon to not only achieve the articulated objective
of predictable punishment but also to ensure that defendants are appropriately
reprimanded. This is particularly true given the Court’s consideration of the
reprehensibility of Exxon’s conduct when limiting punitive damages so
stringently. For example, one district court opined that punitive damages in a
false arrest case were sufficient where the conduct was “outrageous” but
resulted in “no significant harm.”199 Although this application was converse to
Exxon (as the harm was less significant than the conduct itself), it illustrates
the willingness of lower courts to justify awards based on Exxon’s rationale of
reprehensibility. Still, other courts will apply Exxon to demonstrate that their
awards comport with reasonability by employing the Exxon bright-line as a
guidepost. Assessments premised upon this rationale will proceed from the
theory that if a 1:1 ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages
was heralded as the maximum in one area, the courts are justified if they
designate even lower ratios.200
Before the Court handed down its final decision in Exxon, some predicted
the decision was “not likely to affect punitive damages in non-maritime
cases.”201 But in the immediate months after Exxon, one court had already
remarked that “it is clear that the Supreme Court intends that its holding have a
much broader application.”202 While only the grace of time and patience of the
judicial system will indicate exactly how Exxon will be applied outside of
admiralty, its application is imminent.
CONCLUSION
For Exxon, one of the world’s oil giants, Exxon was the grand finale of
twenty years of litigation; for the plaintiff fishermen and Native Alaskans, it

198. Research Corp. v. Westport Ins. Corp., 289 Fed.Appx. 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2008).
199. Ellis v. La Vecchia, 567 F.Supp.2d 601, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations omitted).
200. See, e.g., Glass v. Snellbaker, CA No. 05-1971, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71241, at *39
(D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008) (noting that the punitive damages awarded only half of what plaintiff
would receive in back pay in adverse employment case).
201. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Take Up Battle over Exxon Valdez Damages, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2008, at A19.
202. Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F.Supp.2d 429, 483 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
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was a “knife in the gut” and a “giant cold slap in the face.”203 Without a doubt,
a decision that removes $2 billion from damages and imposes a bright-line rule
on remedies is a decision whose impact is not only substantial to the parties
involved, but also to each future, similarly-situated litigant. It is the Exxon
doctrine, and despite its faults, it is here to stay.
The discourse between the general common law and admiralty law will
only continue to grow as federal courts continue to borrow, interpret, and
articulate principles of state law to fill its voids. State courts will readopt these
laws as “new takes” on their old laws regardless of the context in which these
laws were changed; the rationale for one rule in one context is often, as it will
be in Exxon, strong rationale for many rules in many contexts.
Exxon and its progeny will reinforce the discourse between general
common law and admiralty law as state laws take note of Exxon’s broad scope
and introduce it into their common law. Exxon is a rare composite of law old
and new, borrowed and blue. Exxon’s original context in maritime and its
adoption of state law will be distilled as courts work through its application in
both the due process analysis and general limitation of punitive damages. The
oil has been cleaned, yet the legacy of Exxon is one mess that will continue to
impact the law for centuries to come.
ERIN L. BROOKS

203. Christopher Maag, In Alaska, Rage and Sorrow over Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2008, at A19.
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